Beam, Idaho , , P. The focus of our present inquiry is to determine whether or not I. These challenges arise out of the judicial proceeding just concluded. At this point, counsel has been closely involved with the case for some time, has been present at trial, and has had notice of all issues that are appropriate to be raised within this 42 day limit. All that counsel is required to do is to organize all challenges and issues that arose during trial and are appropriate for appeal within 42 days.
That is not an unduly burdensome task. The statute provides adequate notice to the defendant of exactly what is required of him, and sufficient opportunity for all challenges to be heard.
In addition, it serves the purpose of the legislature by preventing the unnecessary delays that occur with so much frequency in capital cases. It is important to note that this limit does not preclude challenges that may arise later, for example, evidence discovered subsequent to completion of the trial. There is no absolute bar on successive petitions for relief. Palmer v. Dermitt, Idaho , P. The legislature has seen fit to appropriately limit the time frame within which to bring challenges which are known or which reasonably should be known.
The process encompassed in I. Rhoades was arrested on March 25, Another Nevada officer, Shires, arrived at the scene as back up. Miller claims to have heard that first statement, although it was not included in his initial report of the arrest. Miller did include that fact in a supplemental report filed two months later. Officer McIntosh testified that he did not hear the statement, nor was it overheard by Trooper Neville. He did not make any statements en route. Shaw made a statement to the defendant to the effect that if he had been apprehended earlier, the victims of his crimes might still be alive.
Both Shires and Miller reported the statement in supplemental reports filed several months after the arrest. The statement was also not recorded by Officer Shaw in his report. Rhoades made no further statements. Rhoades argues on this appeal that the trial court should have excluded those statements for three reasons: 1 the questionable reliability of the evidence, given the fact that several of the officers who claimed to overhear the statements failed to record the fact in their reports until months after the arrest; 2 the failure of the police to tape record the statements; and 3 the statements were the result of the violation of Rhoades's Miranda rights.
On the first point, the defense argues that due process under the state and federal constitutions requires an enhanced degree of reliability during the guilt determination stage of a capital prosecution.
We reject this argument. The United States Supreme Court has imposed many procedural protections for capital cases. See, e. Ohio, U. However, these cases do not go so far as to alter the types of evidence or establish a minimum degree of reliability of evidence that may be admissible during the fact finding phase of a potential capital case. Admission of evidence is not governed by any separate rules applicable only to capital cases. Therefore, there is no reason to conclude that testimony which is questionable must be excluded during the guilt determination phase of a capital case.
The credibility of evidence in a first degree murder case, as in all others, is an issue for the trier of fact. Likewise, we cannot accept the contention that in order to be admissible, statements made in custody must be tape recorded by the police. The defense cites an Alaska case, Stephan v. That case represents no more than the prerogative of each state to extend the protections of its own constitution beyond the parameters of federal constitutional guarantees.
We decline to adopt Alaska's standard in Idaho. We now turn to the issue of whether Rhoades's Miranda rights were violated by the police during his arrest and custody. There is some conflict in the record as to whether Rhoades was read his Miranda rights while in the custody of Nevada Officers Miller and Neville, or if he was given the Miranda warnings for the first time by Officer Rodriguez after Rodriguez, Shaw, and McIntosh arrived at the scene.
Although the record does not support the trial court's finding that the first statement by Rhoades was preceded by a Miranda warning, that factual issue does not affect our conclusion that both statements were properly admitted into evidence. So spontaneous in fact, that according to uncontested police accounts, Rhoades made the statement without being questioned or otherwise addressed by any of the officers present.
As a spontaneous statement, it was admissible whether it occurred before or after Rhoades was read his Miranda rights. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment. Arizona, U. The second statement at the station house, made in response to Shaw's comment, is also admissible. The trial court found that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support the inference that Rhoades had asserted his right to remain silent at any time during the arrest and booking.
Officer McIntosh did testify that after Rodriguez finished reading the Miranda rights, Rhoades nodded as if to indicate that he understood. Then McIntosh testified that Rodriguez said something else, which McIntosh could not hear, whereupon Rhoades shook his head.
McIntosh took the gesture to mean that Rhoades was asserting his right to remain silent. Those facts are the sole basis in the record for the contention that Rhoades did assert his right to remain silent.
There is no evidence in the record as to what Rhoades was responding to when he shook his head negatively. On the strength of this evidence alone, the trial court declined to infer that the shake of the head indicated a desire to remain silent.
That finding is not clearly erroneous, given the lack of evidence to the contrary. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time, prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.
In this case, based on the record before us, Rhoades did not assert his right to remain silent. The requirement that interrogation must cease comes into play when the accused indicates in any manner that he or she does not desire to converse with the police, or that the presence of an attorney is desired.
After rights are read to and acknowledged by the detainee, and until the right to silence or counsel is asserted, the police may initiate questioning. The record indicates that Rhoades was read his rights before the second statement and acknowledged that he understood them. Although there is evidence that Rhoades was heavily influenced by narcotics at the time of the arrest, Officer Shaw testified that while searching his person, he engaged Rhoades in conversation to test his alertness and found that he had sufficient capacity to understand what was going on around him.
In sum, Rhoades had been instructed upon and understood his rights at the time of arrest, and there is insufficient evidence to indicate that he asserted his right to remain silent.
Part of the materials submitted to the defense in this exchange was a supplementary police report by Detective Newbold of the Blackfoot Police Department, which detailed the confession of Kevin Buckholz to the killing of Stacy Baldwin. Buckholz had been arrested by Blackfoot Police Officer Love on March 14, , for drunk and disorderly conduct. Christian reported the incident to Detective Newbold, who summarized the statement in his own report.
That report was provided to defense counsel for Rhoades pursuant to the discovery request for Blackfoot City Police reports.
Newbold's report mentions Christian's written report, and outlines that report in detail. However, neither Christian's nor Love's report was provided to the defense. On appeal, Rhoades argues that the prosecution's compliance with the discovery request was inadequate, and in violation of the prosecutor's duty to turn over all exculpatory evidence to the defense.
Although this appeal concerns the conviction for the murder of Susan Michelbacher, Buckholz's confession is significant because the killings of Michelbacher and Baldwin were linked by ballistic evidence establishing that the same murder weapon was used in the commission of both crimes.
The test by which to measure the prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence is the materiality of the information at issue. Brown, 98 Idaho , P. Agurs, U. We do not believe that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the defense received the two other police reports. Officer Newbold's report provided enough detail to stimulate additional inquiry if the defense had been inclined to do so.
The defense had the information that there was a confession to the Baldwin murder, the identity of the confessor, the details of the confession, and the name of the officer who heard the confession. With that information they could have contacted Officer Christian and Kevin Buckholz and determined from them whether the confession was worth pursuing. The defense claims that had they received the two additional reports from the prosecution then they would have made more of an effort to locate Buckholz.
We believe that the defense could have made that determination without the other two police reports. Appellant claims that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury in a number of respects. Specifically: 1. The court should have instructed on the difference between general intent crimes and specific intent crimes. The court should have instructed on mens rea and the concurrence of act and intent. The court wrongly refused instructions and inadequately defined legal terms. Appellant asserts that the refusal to instruct on specific intent when a defendant is charged with both specific intent and general intent crimes constitutes error because it could mislead the jury.
Appellant cites several California cases for this proposition; however, it was not held in any of these cases to be reversible or prejudicial error.
This Court held, in State v. Lankford, Idaho , , P. We hold that the court's instructions to the jury were adequate.
Fisk, 92 Idaho , , P. We conclude that the instructions given adequately informed the jury of the law applicable to the issues in question. The defendant hired a ballistics and hair expert to examine the State's evidence. The expert did not prepare or provide any written reports to the defense.
The trial court ruled that the expert must either provide a written report to the prosecutor or allow the prosecutor to interview him pursuant to Rule 16 c 2 of the Idaho Criminal Rules, which provides:. Upon written request of the prosecuting attorney, the defendant shall permit the state to inspect and copy or photograph any results or reports of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the possession or control of the defendant, which the defendant intends to introduce in evidence at the trial, or which were prepared by a witness whom the defendant intends to call at the trial when the results or reports relate to testimony of the witness.
Idaho Criminal Rule 16 c 2 clearly allows access to reports which the defendant intends to introduce at trial or which were prepared by a witness whom the defendant intends to call at trial. However, in ordering a defense expert to prepare a report for opposing counsel, or to submit to an interview by opposing counsel, the court overstepped the boundaries of the rule.
The Washington Supreme Court interpreted an analogous criminal discovery rule, in State v. Hutchinson, Wash. They held that:. It is undisputed that the defendant may be required to disclose any existing expert's report he intends to use at trial.
However, the rule does not say that an expert can be required to make a report at the request of the opposing party. Defense counsel claims that no written reports have been requested, received or written.
The clear language of the rule does not authorize the trial court to require the defendant's experts to prepare written reports for the state when they have not been prepared for the defendant. However, we do not believe that this error resulted in prejudice to the defendant. This case differs from Hutchinson, because here, the defense did anticipate having the expert prepare a report, but told the prosecutor that it would not be available until a week before trial.
The prosecutor was concerned that this would not be enough time in which to use the evidence to prepare for trial. In managing the trial procedure, the court set a deadline for the production of the expert report, which was within his authority.
We now turn to the issue of the victim impact statement contained in the presentence report. Booth v. Maryland, U. In Booth, there were two types of information presented in the victim impact statement. In the present case, the victim impact statement, in its entirety, states: The victim in this instant offense, Susan Michelbacher, was a 31 year old wife and mother.
She had been a teacher for about 11 years, she was a member of the Christian Science Church, she was active in sports and community affairs, and a memorial has been established in her name.
Her husband, Bert Michelbacher, has suffered emotional trauma at the loss of his wife and her companionship. He explained that for several months he was unable to perform his duties as project engineer at his place of employment at the level of efficiency he is accustomed to. The crime has also had a profound affect [sic] on his financial situation. He has had to hire a full-time nanny to care for his son, he has required some costly psychiatric counseling which was only partially covered by his health insurance plan, and he related that he had to purchase a replacement vehicle for the Ford van, which he cannot bear to look at much less drive.
He explained that he wanted to sell the van, but due to it's relationship to the crimes, no one wants to buy it. Michelbacher expressed a dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system and it's [sic] tendency to protect the criminal. He seemed to be harboring a significant amount of anger in addition to his grief and sorrow.
He stated that he wanted to see justice done. He indicated that by the time justice is done, if justice is done, no one will remember who Susan Michelbacher was or what Paul Rhoades did to her.
This is undoubtedly a victim impact statement of the kind contemplated in Booth v. Maryland, and as such, it was error for the trial court to admit it. The next level of inquiry is to determine if the victim impact statement constitutes harmless error under the State v.
Paz, Idaho , P. This Court, in Paz, relied on Chapman v. Texas, U. There is no indication that any evidence of the kind proscribed by Booth diverted the trial court from its primary function of considering the defendant being sentenced and not the victim or the victim's family.
In reviewing the record in this case, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim impact statement in the presentence investigation report did not influence the trial court in its imposition of sentence. The error was therefore harmless, and the case need not be remanded for sentencing. Appellant asserts that the trial court failed to adequately consider alternatives to the death penalty. In State v. Leavitt, Idaho , P. Clearly, alternatives were and are available to a sentencing court, such as a fixed life sentence.
We hold that this is sufficient to indicate that the trial court did consider alternatives to the death penalty and decided against imposing them after contemplating the unique circumstances of this case. The defendant also asserts that mitigating factors were not adequately considered. The pertinent section of I. Where the court finds a statutory aggravating circumstance the court shall sentence the defendant to death unless the court finds that mitigating circumstances which may be presented outweigh the gravity of any aggravating circumstance found and make imposition of death unjust.
Here, the trial court outlined the mitigating factors in detail, taking into consideration the defendant's education, social and economic status, vocational skills, drug and alcohol use, criminal record, personal redeeming characteristics, and the fact that he has been a cooperative prisoner since the time of his arrest.
The court then went on to find three aggravating factors as listed in I. All of this was well within the guidelines of the statute. As for the defendant's claim that the trial court engaged in impermissible speculation and overemphasized aggravating factors, we find no merit in this argument. To be sure, the trial court did employ language that could be construed as passionate or emotional, but we will not presume to dictate the writing style which judges must use in their findings.
The trial court carefully followed the provisions of I. We find no abuse of discretion. The final issue presented by the defendant concerning the imposition of the death penalty is that he was improperly sentenced by a judge without jury input.
Creech, Idaho , , P. Mississippi, U. Defendant objected to the practice of transporting the jurors from Boise to Idaho Falls for the trial. He asserted that there were at least four jurors who were excused solely because it was inconvenient for them to have to travel to Idaho Falls, and that they would have been able to serve if the trial had been held in Boise.
Defense counsel voiced this objection and listed the jurors who fell into this category. One juror had three small children and her husband was away from home, another was a sole proprietor and could not leave his business, the third had a husband who had just undergone surgery, and the fourth was planning a move out of state.
Appellant also assigns error to the exclusion of two potential jurors. One of them, Michael Krubsack, was passed for cause by both sides. The next day he requested an opportunity to speak to the court again, and said that he and his family were planning a move out of state and that having to go to Idaho Falls for the trial would pose an extreme hardship. The other, Michael Landry, was excused for various reasons. The court found that he would be a disruptive juror and would not act with impartiality.
His father was in prison for murdering several members of his family, and this left Landry with some strong opinions in favor of the death penalty. Rhoades contends that the prosecution's decision to charge weapons enhancements as separate counts in the indictment was prejudicial, in that it would lead a jury to believe that Rhoades was charged with additional crimes. He argues that I. This was not error. After independently reviewing the record and transcript describing the character of the defendant, the nature of the crime of which he has been convicted, the circumstances of the crime of which he has been convicted, we hold that there existed an adequate basis for imposing the death penalty.
The judgment entered and sentence imposed are affirmed. Pro Tem. I write only to point out that Rhoades challenged the propriety of the reasonable doubt instruction given by the trial court. The portion of this instruction that Rhoades asserted was the most objectionable stated: A reasonable doubt is an actual doubt based upon the evidence or lack of evidence. It is such doubt as you are conscious of after going over in your minds the entire case and giving consideration to all the testimony.
If you then feel uncertain and not fully convinced that the defendant is guilty or if you feel that you would not be acting reasonably should you find him guilty, and if you believe that a reasonable man in any matter of like importance in his own affairs would hesitate to act because of such doubt as you are conscious of having, then that is a reasonable doubt, and the defendant is entitled to the benefit of it.
Rhoades has cited Cage v. Louisiana, U. The instruction in this case does not have these same defects. In applying the harmless error rule in death penalty cases where victim impact statement information was included in the record before the trial court, I would require a statement by the trial court that the information had not been considered. For the murders of Susan Michelbacher and Stacy Baldwin, Rhoades was sentenced to death; for the murder of Nolan Haddon, he received an indeterminate life sentence based on a conditional plea.
Appellant filed a petition for rehearing on March 4, In it, he requested rehearing on nine issues. On April 8, , we granted rehearing only as to the constitutionality of the reasonable doubt jury instruction.
This jury instruction was read to the jury as follows: A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in a case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an acquittal. Thus a defendant, although accused, begins the trial with a clean slate with no evidence against him. And the law permits nothing but legal evidence presented before the jury to be considered in support of any charge against the accused.
The effect of this presumption is to place upon the State the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not mere possible doubt, because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.
It is the state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. A reasonable doubt is an actual doubt based upon the evidence or lack of evidence.
But if, after considering all of the evidence, you have an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, then you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, and you should render your verdict accordingly.
Appellant attacks the third paragraph of the reasonable doubt instruction. The thrust of appellant's argument is that the instruction, read as a whole, could be interpreted by a juror to suggest that a higher degree of doubt than a reasonable doubt is necessary in order to acquit. The analysis of the issue on rehearing must begin with the fundamental principle of criminal law: Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
In re Winship, U. Holm, 93 Idaho , , P. So, when a jury is instructed on the reasonable doubt standard, the instruction cannot raise the degree of doubt necessary for an acquittal. Appellant points to the fact that the jury instruction given in the district court below was not identical to the California jury instruction that we announced our preference for in Holm, 93 Idaho at —08, P.
Cotton, Idaho , , P. Today, we again reaffirm the holding of Cotton that the only appropriate instruction on reasonable doubt is the California jury instruction.
In this case, appellant requested the district court to give a reasonable doubt jury instruction that was identical to the preferred California jury instruction. The court gave an instruction that included the language of the California instruction with an additional two paragraphs. While it was inappropriate for the district court to not give the California jury instruction, our review is limited to whether the instruction that was given to the jury misstated the law or was so confusing and argumentative as to mislead the jury.
Cotton, Idaho at , P. We conclude that the Cage instruction is not similar to the instruction at issue in this case.
Accord, Lord v. State, Nev. The instruction given to the jury in this case contained the California jury instruction. However, it expanded on that definition. The first two paragraphs of the instruction constitute the preferred California instruction.
Any embellishment or addition to the California reasonable doubt instruction risks misstating the law. Upon issuance of the remittitur, the district court shall set a new execution date. Chief Justice Bakes, at that time an Associate Justice of the Court, specially concurred in Cotton, wrote what this one member of the Court viewed as being more of a dissent than was a concurrence:.
I question, however, That instruction has its own problems. It is founded on analogy or induction, experience of the ordinary course of nature, and the testimony of men. This no doubt accounts for those cases [cited by the majority], which state that either it is error for a trial judge to attempt to define reasonable doubt, or that it is not error to fail to define the term.
Therefore an instruction purporting to define reasonable doubt should not be given. State, Wyo. Cotton, Idaho at —80, P. Another member of that Court, Bistline, J. On the other hand we have one member of the Court casting doubt on that instruction.
There is much to what Justice Bakes writes. It does seem that, the question having been raised by Justice Bakes, some further discussion by the Court might have been in order. Frankly, as with Justice Bakes, I do not see much in the California jury instruction to commend it. Sitting as the new member of a court which has allowed itself to become deeply involved in the making of rules, some of which I fear transcend into the substantive law, it seems that we could take time to delve more deeply into the validity of the instruction now brought in question.
Criticism of the California instruction means little, however, unless it is constructive. The law places upon the State the burden of proving the defendant guilty. This is not the burden of proving that the defendant is more likely guilty than innocent, but requires that the evidence presented prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Doubt is a word of common usage and needs no further definition.
A reasonable doubt is simply a doubt which you would entertain because it is reasonable. If, however, to you the doubt is not reasonable, then you will not entertain it, but cast it out. Hence you are simply instructed that the evidence presented must convince you at least beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. The words of Justice Bakes were well chosen then and are still applicable. The California instruction is confusing and, in all likelihood, unnecessary.
In fact, the instruction here furnished to the Rhoades jury is nothing more than a compilation of vague terms one piled upon another. Conversely, the ill-conceived attempt to define what constitutes reasonable doubt could cause the jury to actually lower the state's burden of proof.
It is impossible to conclude that the above compilation of ambiguous terms served any purpose other than to confuse the jury. In light of these considerations of the instruction as given, there is now one justice's certain vote that the better and proper course would be to reverse and remand for a new trial, where, hopefully, an improved instruction, if one is to be given, would be of some aid to the jury.
Baldwin Direct Appeal. Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, first degree kidnapping, robbery, and use of firearms following jury trial in the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, County of Bingham, James C. Herndon, J. This case arises from the murder of Stacy Baldwin. On February 28, , Stacy Baldwin was abducted from the convenience store where she was working near Blackfoot, Idaho. Whether a prejudicial statement made by one juror to another should have been grounds for a mistrial.
Whether the trial court should have excluded testimony by a jailhouse informant. Whether the court erroneously considered victim impact statements. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion for continuance to allow for the attendance of the defense's forensic expert. Proportionality of the sentence imposed.
Rhoades asserts that the trial court should have granted a mistrial because of a prejudicial statement allegedly made by one juror to another. On May 13, , the 7th Judicial District Court for Bingham County made and entered its findings of the Court in considering the death penalty, finding that Rhoades is guilty of murder in the first degree and kidnapping in the first degree and imposing the sentence of death. On October 11, , the U. Supreme Court refused to hear Rhoades' case.
The warrant ordered that Rhoades be executed on November 18, On November 4, , the Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole decide to deny the petition for a commutation hearing submitted on behalf of Rhoades. On November 14, , a U. Magistrate Judge denied a stay of execution. On November 16, , the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals denied an emergency stay. On November 18, , Rhoades was executed by lethal injection.
Planned schedule for November 18, a. Media center opens to pre-approved news media personnel a. Selection of news media witnesses a. IDOC van available for transport to demonstration area a. News media witnesses transported to Idaho Maximum Security Institution a. Offender is moved from isolation cell to execution chamber a.
IDOC van returns from demonstration area a. Witnesses are escorted into execution chamber a. Warden asks offender if he wishes to make a final statement a. Administration of chemicals begins a. Coroner enters chamber, examines the condemned and pronounces death a.
Demonstration area closes p. Media center closes KTVB. She put up a fight as Rhoades tried to sexually assault her.
He shot her in the back as she was running away. March 17, - Nolan Haddon, 23, was shot while working at Buck's convenience store in Idaho Falls. He was a student at a technical-vocational school. Haddon's body was found in the store's walk-in cooler. March 19, - Susan Michelbacher, 34, was abducted in grocery store parking lot at 7 a. March 25, - Paul Ezra Rhoades crashed his mother's car near Wells, Nevada, and walked to a nearby casino. Inside his car, police found the weapon and the same bullets used in the three murders.
Detectives located Rhoades, playing blackjack in a casino. May 24, - U. District Judge Edward Lodge denied Rhoades' petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Circuit Court of Appeals, claiming that Idaho's new lethal injection protocol is likely to be botched, causing him to suffer excruciating pain in violation of the 8th Amendment. Circuit Court of Appeals denies Rhoades' plea to stop the scheduled execution of Rhoades.
His lawyer argued Idaho's new lethal injection policy is flawed and results in cruel and unusual punishment. Rhoades accepted blame for his role in the killing of Susan Michelbacher, an Idaho Falls schoolteacher. His role, implying he did not act alone in her abduction, rape and shooting. His mercy, still, never extended to the families of his victims.
Even in his final, hurtful moments. Final moments that are given added weight, and added public attention, when we as a society choose to carry out the death penalty. Idaho did not kill an innocent man Friday. On that, I have no doubt. I do feel sadness for the platform that execution affords Rhoades. That, it seems, is simply a prerequisite to being a member of the human race.
I cannot begin to imagine what they have endured for 24 years, nor would I ever want to. I only feel sorrow for them, especially in light of what they had to hear Friday morning. Before Idaho carried out its first execution in 17 years, Gov. Butch Otter had spent much of the week in Maui at a conference. Rhoades took full and unfettered advantage of his right to due process of law for more than 20 years. That process has run its course and Mr. Rhoades has been held accountable for his actions.
The state of Idaho has done its best to fulfill this most solemn responsibility with respect, professionalism and most of all dignity for everyone involved. The inmate in question was charged with three Southeastern Idaho murders almost 25 years ago. Paul Ezra Rhoades was sentenced to death for the kidnapping and murders of 34 year old Susan Michelbacher and 21 year old Stacy Dawn Baldwin.
Following the murder of 20 year old Nolan Haddon, Rhoades was also sentenced to life in prison without parole. At a. Local resident Dave Sylvester says, "I don't look at it as punishment.
I just figure that person is so miserable, sitting there. I think that I would choose the death sentence, if it came down to it for myself. The person can repent, and turn their life for the good one. Jennifer says, "If it had been your mother, sister, wife, or girlfriend, you would want justice. Him in a prison cell with tv and free food is not justice.
I've been through the system and I had help. The difference is I took the help I was given and made something of myself! None worked. Rhoades earlier admitted his crimes, which terrorized an eastern Idaho community for three weeks in His appeals have focused mostly on technicalities and on his abusive childhood and drug addiction. He said he had changed in his quarter-century in prison. Rhoades received the death sentence for the kidnappings and murders of year-old Susan Michelbacher and year-old Stacy Dawn Baldwin in He also was sentenced to life in prison without parole for the murder of year-old Nolan Haddon, to which he pleaded guilty.
Haddon also worked at a convenience store. He had long hair, and investigators speculated that Rhoades may have mistaken him for a young woman because of his blond locks. In any case, Rhoades robbed the convenience store, shooting Haddon five times and leaving him for dead in a walk-in cooler.
Haddon died several hours later. Rhoades, an Idaho Falls native, was the first Idaho inmate to be executed since and the only person to be involuntarily put to death in the state since The last inmate to be executed gave up all of his remaining appeals and asked the state to carry out his lethal injection.
The execution was the target of protests by capital punishment activists outside the prison south of Boise. Early Friday, about 50 people braved the cold and wind to protest at the prison's entrance. Some of them sat on the ground in silence, while others prayed collectively and waved signs with messages such as "What Would Jesus Do? Across the street, about a half-dozen people gathered in a fenced-off area designated for supporters of the death penalty.
Rhoades admitted committing the murders, but he and his lawyers have vigorously appealed his case and Idaho's new execution protocols and procedures. On Thursday, the 9th U. Circuit Court of Appeals denied a request for a full judge's panel to review their appeal, and Rhoades' attorneys also filed a last-ditch appeal to the U. Supreme Court.
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